

OTHERING THE MINORITY: *Comparative Study of Papua in Indonesia's New Order Era and Rohingya in Myanmar during Military Junta*

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Abstract

The paper examines the comparative study of subaltern between Papua in Indonesia's New Order era and Rohingya in Myanmar during military rule. In Indonesia, Papuan case is an example of how the centralistic military regime treats Papuan ethnic as an object and treat them as "the others" rather than considers them as a part of "Indonesian entity" as the subject itself. Meanwhile in Myanmar, Rohingya case is an example of how centralistic military junta regime treats Rohingya ethnic as "the others" and considers them as foreigners in Myanmar. This paper found a significant difference between the treatment of Indonesian military regime towards Papuan ethnic and the treatment of Myanmar military junta regime towards Rohingya ethnic. In Indonesia, the military regime acknowledges Papuan as a citizen of Indonesia. However, the regime considers Papuan as the "different other" nonetheless. Their different race and ethnicity from Java and Malay ethnic as the majority ethnic are not the subject of the cause, yet it is caused by Papuan traditional behavior which is regarded as "backward" as by the central regime. Meanwhile in Myanmar, since the enforcement of citizenship law in 1982, the military regime clearly does not acknowledge Rohingya from the state citizenship because of their identities, such as religion and Rohingya historical background.

Keywords: othering, comparative politics, Myanmar, Indonesia, military rule.

Abstrak

Makalah ini membahas studi perbandingan subaltern antara Papua di era Orde Baru Indonesia dan Rohingya di Myanmar selama pemerintahan militer. Di Indonesia, kasus Papua adalah contoh bagaimana rezim militer sentralistik memperlakukan etnis Papua sebagai objek dan memperlakukan mereka sebagai "yang lain" daripada menganggap mereka sebagai bagian dari "entitas Indonesia" sebagai subjek itu sendiri. Sementara itu di Myanmar, kasus Rohingya adalah contoh bagaimana rezim junta militer yang sentralistik memperlakukan etnis Rohingya sebagai "yang lain" dan menganggap mereka sebagai orang asing di Myanmar. Makalah ini menemukan perbedaan yang signifikan antara perlakuan rezim militer Indonesia terhadap etnis Papua dan perlakuan rezim militer junta Myanmar terhadap etnis Rohingya. Di Indonesia, rezim militer mengakui Papua sebagai warga negara Indonesia. Namun, rezim menganggap Papua sebagai "orang lain yang berbeda". Perbedaan ras dan etnisitas mereka dari etnis Jawa dan Melayu sebagai etnis mayoritas bukanlah subjek penyebabnya, namun itu disebabkan oleh perilaku tradisional Papua yang dianggap "terbelakang" seperti oleh rezim pusat. Sementara itu di Myanmar, sejak diberlakukannya hukum kewarganegaraan pada tahun 1982, rezim militer jelas tidak mengakui Rohingya dari kewarganegaraan negara karena identitas mereka, seperti agama dan latar belakang sejarah Rohingya.

Kata kunci: othering, politik komparatif, Myanmar, Indonesia, pemerintahan militer

INTRODUCTION

The proliferation of post-colonial countries in Southeast Asia was followed by the rise of dictatorial regimes dominated by the military in the region. During the reign of dictatorial-military regime, Indonesia and Myanmar experienced civil oppression from the government. From the oppression, the one that suffered the most was minority-sub-alternate people who faced discrimination from the government and other groups of civilian as well.

In Indonesia, military dominated political sphere for more than 30 years under the regime of President Soeharto. Despite military involvement in Indonesian politic had already existed since Soekarno era, the New Order regime was the era wherein the government was almost fully controlled and dominated by the military. In Indonesia, the authoritarian regime is centralized and it had a repressive approach in dealing with protests from minority such as Papuans and Acehese.

Papua was integrated to Indonesia through international political process, in which Indonesia succeeded to gain support from the United States and the United Nations that forced the Netherlands to transfer Papua to Indonesia. However, the Papuans already had senses of Papuan nationalism. On the other hand, Indonesia came to Papua with white-man-burden-like mindset. Indonesia's New Order regime treated Papuans as if they were an object to be civilized. This mindset affected how the New Order's Indonesia developed Papuan economy. The government was likely to entrust strategic positions and economic activities to the migrants who mostly came from Java. As the result, Papuan natives were excluded from the development process and they felt exploited for their natural resources.

In Myanmar, the military seized the power through *coup d'état* to civilian government in 1962. Myanmar military regime endured for almost half a century (1962-2011) and divided into two different regimes. The first regime was led by General Ne Win from 1962 to 1988 and the second regime was ruled by powerful Board of Generals. Myanmar military regime

was primarily maintained hostility to foreigners. The Rohingya people were considered as British colonial legacy as well as former ally of British colonial government by the Myanmar military regimes. The colonial policies encouraged migrant labor from Rohingya to increase rice cultivation and profits. Rohingyas entered Myanmar as part of these policies in the 19th century. The military government hostility to Rohingya was obvious, as in 1962 Rohingyas were not included to citizenship act. Thus, they are not considered as citizen of the Myanmar and they do not have civil and political rights in Myanmar.

Human rights, as declared in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, guarantee the freedom from all forms of discrimination and the right to obtain independence as set out in Articles 1-3. Human rights, per both individual and group, guarantee equal rights and self-determination, as cited in the UN charter in Chapter I Article 1.

Despite the UN Charter has already existed since the establishment of the UN, the newly post-colonial countries like Indonesia and Myanmar are still unfamiliar. Besides, they also oppress their people in many ways, especially during military rule era. Thus, their regimes were inseparable to human rights violations. In order to explain the reasons of two countries often violate human rights, the understanding about two important concepts is needed. The first concept is subaltern concept and the second one is otherness concept. Both two concepts are important since they explain about why the oppression does happen.

SUBALTERN CONCEPT

The 'subalterns' are those who are narratively marginalized due to their few numbers or poor accessibility to political power, such as peasants, workers, women, and minority ethnics. Subalterns refer to people that do not have political power and voice of their own, and they are always positioned as "objects". According to Antonio Gramsci, subaltern classes refer fundamentally to any "low-rank" person or group of people in particular society who suf-

fering under hegemonic domination of a ruling elite class. The ruling elites deny them from the basic rights of participation in the making of local history and culture as active individuals of the same nation (Louai, 2011, p. 5).

According to David Ludden (2003), the word subaltern was already known from the late medieval English and the word applied to a peasants and vassals. By 1700, it denoted low ranks in the military suggesting the origins of peasants. Gayatri Spivak (1988) said the concept of subaltern is one of the most slippery and difficult to define. This problem is the legacy of the colonial administration which has been constructed by the colonizers. When the Colony has been proclaimed independent, this colonial view has been preserved by the newly post-colonial state (Spivak, 1988, p. 271-313). The subaltern was formed and represented in a particular political landscape, the landscape that entrapped subalterns under hegemonic power of majority groups. Voices of sub-alternate groups such as Papua and Rohingya are evaporated since their voices in ASEAN are represented only by state which does not favor them.

It is important to be critical on how sub-alternate groups within the postcolonial states treated by the new states. Nowadays, these kinds of 'subaltern' communities exist in Southeast Asia. There are some minority ethnic groups such as Papuans in Indonesia, Dayaks in Malaysia, Pattani and Mons in Thailand, or Rohingyas and Karens in Myanmar. The subalterns in the new context are likely those who are marginalized due to their few numbers or apolitical positions. Most of them are minority groups that are treated as an object and do not have a voice to speak, as the narrative dominated by the majority groups.

The numbers of subalterns have resisted and it can be seen from groups which are attempting to express their form of resistance through separatism or political insurgencies, such as Komite Nasional Papua Barat in Indonesia or Moro Islamic Liberation Front which have been accused as national threats by each national authority. In another prominent

case, there are Rohingya people in Myanmar, who were externally displaced and taken refugees and hence leaving. In the context of Rohingya and Papua, subaltern is the minority group who is oppressed and placed unequally to majority groups within the state due to religion, ethnicity, language, and racial differences to majority. As the result, they are considered as "significant other".

OTHERNESS CONCEPT

The oppression towards subalterns is deeply related to the concept of otherness. Otherness is the view on how the majority see the subalterned people as the significant others. Otherness is a part of existentialism which was first coined by Hegel and it was adopted by Edmund Husserl in phenomenology. Besides, the concept of otherness is also embraced by prominent thinkers such as Jaques Derrida and Simone De Beauvoir.

The concept of "otherness" originally tries to understand the views of subordination of dominant group that define themselves as the self towards dominated group as them or the object outside the self. Otherness is a result of a discursive process whereas a dominant group (that defines themselves as "us" the self) constructs one or many dominated-out groups (that is defined as "them" the other) (Staszak, 2012, p. 2). In this discursive process, the dominant group stigmatizes a difference, either it is real or imaginative, or it is presented as a negation of identity. Thus, it becomes a motive for potential discrimination.

Hegel emphasized that the "other" is a constituent part of self-consciousness, the preoccupation with the self that complements the propositions about self-awareness. Self-consciousness factor is important to determine the view of the self towards other entity and how people define the object outside the self. The self-consciousness, which is how an individual or group wanted to be seen by others, is driven by unpleasant feelings when they are observed by others, hence they need to behave in order to create the imagery which they wanted to be seen

by others. This specific behavior is a respond to outer social and political circumstances.

The dominant groups identify themselves as superior to the others and hence they treat the subalterns as the others unequally as they want to show their superiority. In colonial context, othering establishes unequal relationships of power between the colonized natives and the colonizers (White Europeans). The colonizers believed that they are essentially superior to the natives whom they othered into racial inferiority, as the non-white.

In post-colonial countries, in this case Indonesia and Myanmar, othering does not only relate to white and non-white native but also the hierarchy of domination creating unequal relations between majority groups and minority groups. In Papua and Rohingya context, they can be seen as objects which narratively described and mapped by the "self". The self in this case is a state; it is the Republic of Indonesia in Indonesian case and the unitary state in Myanmar case. Indonesia under the New Order regime and Myanmar under its military regime identified the subalterns; in this case are Papuan natives and Rohingyas as "other" – hence this is what is commonly known as "Otherness".

MILITARY AUTHORITARIAN RULE IN INDONESIA

In Indonesia, the New Order regime is a civilian government by form. It is based on the constitution of the 1945, despite the fact that the military has occupied strategic positions and has had a significant role in determining the policy to be taken by the government. President Soeharto himself, when he became an acting President and later inaugurated as President of the Republic of Indonesia in 1968, was an active military general (Sundhaussen, 1995 p. 2), while parliament was controlled by military elements in which the chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) was General A.H. Nasution.

Unlike most of military government that has become public target of criticism since the beginning, the New Order first period 1968-1973 was succeed to gain public support. The New

Order regime began to gain opponents in urban areas in the mid of 1970s. Many of the opposites were made by students and activists of the movement against the regime that began to lean towards authoritarianism and began to queue up. Various oppositions did occur among urban activists and students, but the New Order managed to control the media and move to villages with military power to gain the support of rural communities who constitute the majority.

The true color of military appeared when they treated their people as an object to be dictated. There were several outbreaks of protests repressed by the regime. They were Malari events in 1974 triggered by student protests against the government, Petisi 50 in 1980, Tanjung Priok incident which was an explosion of tensions between the New Order's military regime and Islamic groups in 1984 (Fatah, 1994, p. 145-404). The last was a student protest in 1998 that was repressed in a repressive manner by the apparatus but succeeded in overthrowing the regime.

Malari riots that were repressively handled by the State resulted in the death toll of 11 people, 177 people were seriously injured, 10 people suffered minor injuries, and 775 people were detained by the military (Fatah, 1994, p. 241-242). The 50th petition of 1980 was not a mass riot but the signatories experienced various intimidations from the State and administrative difficulties (Fatah, 1994, p. 307-310), mainly from the Security and Order Restoration Operation Units (KOPKAMTIB). The 1984 Tanjung Priok incident became an event signifying the military repression of the New Order regime.

Conflict, which is an explosion of tension between Muslims and the government, was repressed by the military, with the various numbers of victims. KOPKAMTIB stated that the death toll reached 40 people, dozens of injured, and hundreds of people suffering material casualties. Another version said that the death toll reached 60 people died and 100 people were injured, even the information

mentioned that the death toll reached hundreds of people (Fatah, 1994, p. 391-393).

Economic-political stability and security for the created society as well as the various government propagandas, which aired in the national media, made the New Order regime relatively unlucky to the apolitical public. Indonesian mass media during the New Order military regime was not only controlled by the government but also the regime was keenly aware of the importance of creating domestic stability through this indoctrination and control. Consequently, it required the mass media to become agents in creating domestic stability (Sen & Hill, 2000, p. 52-53).

The non-functioning media supporting the government in creating national stability will be dissolved, or in the language of that period known as "*bredel*", and the resistance to it will be dealt by the State involving the involvement of the army. During the New Order era, as many as 43 out of 163 newspapers and tabloids were closed down by the government for preaching the government's unexpected news, and considered disturbing the regime's stability (Sen & Hill, 2000, p. 52-53).

SUBALTERN IN INDONESIA: PAPUA CASE

Papua is located in the eastern part of former Dutch East Indies. Unlike the western part of Indonesia, the eastern part was treated better and they had much better relationship with the Dutch colonial administration. Papua, the most eastern part of Dutch East Indies, did not have similar experience of being oppressed by Dutch colonial governments as the western part had. Papua relationship with Dutch colonials was a more peaceful with less hostility compared to western regions. Hence, they are relatively had less feeling as "oppressed colonial entity".

It was Dutch colonial politics during 1950s that made Papua feel less oppressed by colonialism. The Dutch tried to get sympathy of Papuans by gave them a new status from citizen of Papua New Guinea residency into citizen of Government of New Guinea. The Colonial government guaranteed native Papuans involvement to rule

the region along with colonial administrative government. The Dutch Colonial efforts were originally a political maneuver to prevent Papua integrating with Indonesia, hence the colonial government was doing everything they could to make the native Papuans aware of their differences to Indonesia, and then aware of Papua nationalism. By helping native Papuans to be aware of their nationalism, they hope they can create an anti-Indonesia sentiment (Meteray, 2012, p. 145-146).

The Colonial government was able to argue that transferring Papua to Republic of Indonesia would against the native Papuans interest and the principal of self-determination. Furthermore, they argued that transferring Papua to Indonesia would make Papuans become a minority, because they had different languages, culture, and ethnics with the Indonesians. They stated that tribes in Papua already had a consciousness about their identity as a Papuan nation (Meteray, 2012, p. 145-146).

In internal sphere, Colonial government accommodated the interest of native Papuans. The bogus hospitality they had shown to native Papuans was the only way to get their sympathy and make them want to stay as a Dutch Colony rather than joining Indonesia.

The Indonesian government was against the colonial government narrative by stating that the Papua integration to Indonesia was not only the Indonesian own interest but also Papuans interest. Indonesian government stated that the Papuans involved in various resistances against Dutch colonial administration, such as the resistance in Hollandia in 1945 and in 1946, in Manokwari, Babo, Kokas, Fakfak, and Sorong in 1947.

Opposition to integration with Indonesia has started from 1963. Real and perceived cultural and racial differences between the indigenous Melanesians of Papua (at that time called Irian Jaya) and settlers from other parts of Indonesia have been important sources of the political tension. In the past, the Papuans did not share similar experiences of being oppressed as western part society did. The Papuans willingness to be independent from Dutch

colonials, in the same way as the western part society, was actually lesser than the western part people had. Some activists and anthropologists even stated that Papua was forced to integrate with Indonesia by international elite lobbying.

According to human rights and principle of Freedom, the integration of Papua into Indonesia could be seen as a political elite decision. In terms of national integration itself, it will be seen further upon the integration of Papua into the Republic of Indonesia through a structural and affective integration approach. By examining this case, it can be seen whether Papua integration into Indonesia is appropriate or not with the principle of freedom and the right to self-determination, viewed from history of integration.

The process of integration of Papua into Indonesia was carried out through a “problematic” referendum which was held in July-August 1969. The integration process could not be separated from the political power of outside parties (Supriyono, 2014, p. 61). Based on Articles 18 and 20 of the New York Agreement in 1962, the referendum should use the principle of one person, one vote (one man, one vote). However, Papua referendum merely engaged 1,025 Papuans in deciding the integration to Indonesia (Supriyono, 2014, p. 61). Even in international agreements, Papuans had no representatives at all. The fate of Papua is determined by parties outside Papua such as Indonesia Government, the Dutch Government, and the United States Government.

Many activists believe that the integration of Papua as a part of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia was through a deceptive international political process, while there are so many groups of Papuans who wanted Papua to be a fully independent nation (Supriyono, 2016). The political process of “integration into Indonesia” has crushed their hopes of becoming an independent state. The referendum process is not a process for Papuans to freely determine their own interests. Under Indonesian control, the resistance of dissatisfied Papuans is carried out by various groups of people. Papuans educated groups react by holding a national committee

meeting. The Nationalist Party (Parna) leader, Herman Wayoi, and a Nugini Council member, Nicolaas Tanggahma, organized a meeting attended by around 90 Papuan leaders.

The Papuan community, as Rohin Osborne said, was forced to agree and accept the transfer of power from the Netherlands to the United Nations Temporary Executive Administration (UNTEA) and they would also cooperate with UNTEA and the Government of Indonesia. They asked UNTEA to continue to respect their flag and national anthem. Moreover, they asked for the promised referendum to be held in 1963. In the end, none of their requests were fulfilled. The UNTEA period is de facto Indonesia’s full control of Papua (Supriyono, 2014, p. 62).

After taking over Papua in, the military-backed New Order regime imposed “transmigration” policy for non-Papuan to settle in Papua. It has been criticized as an official drive to “colonize” and assimilate the local population. The government placed the migrant houses next to the natives for the assimilation purpose. Indonesian New Order government mobilized the native Papuans who lived in highlands to move into lowlands, the government used military power to force them move, even since Papua still under UNTEA administration.

The government believed that native Papuans could learn the modern way of life from the migrants. The migrants came from various regions across the country such as Madura, North Sumatra, West Sumatra, North Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, South Sulawesi, Ambon, Kei, Timor, Flores, and also significant numbers of Javanese people from East Java, Central Java and Yogyakarta (Supriyono, 2012, p. 43). However, for native Papuan, it was considered as a “Javanization” process (Supriyono, 2016).

The modernization by Indonesian government ironically did not bring any benefit to Papuans, especially in economic prosperity since the Papuans were less competitive in terms of economic skills and knowledge compared to non-Papuans (Supriyono, 2014, p. 61). Furthermore, the development of farming sectors was not applicable to Papuan culture. As the consequence of their less competitiveness,

Papuans were considered not suitable to work as farmers with target such as “*swasembada beras*”. Meanwhile, Javanese people considered as the most suitable groups to do the work. Moreover, the Indonesian elites themselves still considered Papua as second citizen. This view could be seen from former Parliament Member, Burhan Magenda, who said that most of Papuans were still hardly to catch up with modern society.

The exploitation of the territory’s natural resources by government-owned and private commercial interests has also caused concern over traditional rights and environmental degradation. This has fuelled opposition to Indonesian rule in Papua. The New Order’s government allows non-Papuans to run the economic sector whereas they enjoy prosperity more than the Papuans. The native Papuans are still considered as “not ready” and they need to adjust to modern civilization first to catch up with modern economic activity and modern development. The feeling of being more involved in development and the prosperity it possesses actually makes them tend to discriminate and consider Papuans as backward people (Supriyono, 2016). Johannes also said that, there were military officers who take care of the interests of businessmen from outside Papua, not only from Java these businessmen are from Bugis and Makassar (Supriyono, 2016).

The abuse of power by the military has worsened the state imagery for Papuans. They more or less, see the Indonesia as “colonizer” (Supriyono, 2016). Many of Papuans grassroots are still questioning about who has given Indonesia a legitimacy and authority to control and to “*Indonesianize*” Papua. Yet, many Papuans feel that the Indonesian occupation of Papua is not legitimate. Even some Papuans stated that Indonesia is colonizing them (Supriyono, 2014, p. 76).

The new Order government never really considered Papuans as a part of Indonesian society which could be seen by how Papuan sees the unitary state of Indonesia and vice versa. Indonesia since New Order periods has been using conservative view and old approach considered as “securitization” in facing every

turmoil in Papua. Indonesia has always seen Papuans as a distinct “object” that need to pacify by the use of force (Tong, 2006, p. 253-279). As the consequences of being treated as “the other”, the Papuans also feel themselves as the impartial parts of Indonesia.

The New Order authoritarian regime was overthrown by student protests in 1998 and a new government under new “*reformasi*” era was formed. Since then, Indonesia gradually changed their approach toward Papua by establishing special autonomy policy for Papua, called “*otonomi khusus*” or *OTSUS*.

Even if the Indonesian government began to show goodwill through the *OTSUS*, the program has paradox in practice whatsoever. *OTSUS* is more likely to enrich Papuan elites but still far to reach Papuans grassroots (Supriyono, 2009). By the establishment of special autonomy, the central government does not have enough power to control special autonomy practice in detail. The prosperity is mostly enjoyed by the Papuan elites who hold the legislative or executive office rather than bring the prosperity to the rest of Papuans. Many observers said this phenomenon as “Papuans eats Papuans” (Supriyono, 2016; Magenda, 2017). The corrupted money obtained by Papuan elites mostly purposed for infrastructure development.

MILITARY AUTHORITARIAN RULE IN MYANMAR

In Myanmar military junta era, the existing form of government is the board of military officers who holds regional controls and has a function as ministers in a cabinet. This means that in Myanmar, the direct government is operated by military assembly and only contains a few of civilian. The Revolutionary Council itself is a form of Burmese military oligarchy, a state management based on a number of implementers composed of seventeen senior officers in the Burmese military. Theoretically, Burma at that time remained a federal state but in practice the military exercised a centralized regime of power which was characteristic of a unitary state (Devi, 2014, p. 2).

Compared to the Indonesia's New Order, the military regime of Ne Win in Myanmar totally replaces the existing civil administration regime. The military junta's regime was clearly positioned the military as ruling class while the civilians are to be governed. Unlike Indonesia's the New Order cabinet, the Myanmar's military junta in the Ne Win era was filled only by very few civilian elements.

In contrast to what happened in Indonesia, of which managed to gain the support of many layers, especially the apolitical lower society, civilian elites, students, and former government leaders for about five years, the Ne Win military junta regime and its successor, the military junta SLORC are equally repressive and regarded as "criminals who control the State, unlike New Order regime which has support in the first five year of their reign. Similar to the New Order military, the former military regime of Myanmar was respected and gained sympathy from the majority of the people.

On July 7, 1962, as many as 2000 students demonstrated against the Ne Win military coup. The supreme leader of the Revolutionary Council, General Ne Win also responded to the student protest by stating "If all this confusion is done to challenge us (the military regime), I must declare that we (the military) will fight the sword with the sword and devour with the spear" (Zan, 2000, p. 112). Since the incident, the military government of Myanmar became a figure that is hated by the public, especially the well-educated classes like students. The handling of student protests at Rangoon University also used a military repressive approach using firearms. It was estimated that more than 100 people were killed by the military in the protests (Steinberg, 1981, p. 25).

In 1988 as the economic crisis eroded the military-backed and authoritarian military-backed government, thousands of students returned to the streets demanding that the current government resign. The military briefly went to the barracks for a while, but on August 8, 1988, unexpectedly the military responded to the demonstration by repressing the shooting of student demonstrators and blowing up the

unity building of the University of Rangoon University. This action was taken by the military with the leadership of General Sein Lwin, who came to be known as the "*Butcher of Rangoon*" (massacre of Rangoon), resulting in mass deaths of protesters estimated to reach 3000 of 3,000-10,000, though the authorities claimed only 350 were killed. (Meixler, 2018). Military involvement down to the village level alone is a major factor that facilitates the mass mobilization and indoctrination of the military against civilians to the village level in Myanmar to continue to support the USDA (Vogt, 2014, p. 2).

SUBALTERN IN MYANMAR: CITIZENSHIP DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ROHINGYA

The cultural construction of Burma since Pre-Colonial's Kingdom of Burma was marked by the large role of Buddhism in the society and even in political affairs. According to Steinberg (2010), the King of Burma maintained the presence of senior Buddhist monks as the king advisor that had a significant role in influencing public policy. The British ruled Burma for over a century, the colonial government was hostile to Burmans ethnic and Buddhism because of the past relationship that constructed a strong pride as a Burma entity during the Kingdom of Burma's periods. According to Steinberg (2010), Buddhism itself became the substitute indicator of Burmese nationalism when political activity was banned by the British, and monks were martyrs to the nationalism movement and often led it.

The British did not trust Burmans and the colonial government found another actor to run the British-Burma economy. The colonial policies encouraged migrant labor from Rohingya in order to increase rice cultivation and profits. Rohingyas entered Myanmar as a part of these policies in the 19th century. The British also promised the Rohingya separated land refers as "Muslim National Area" in exchange for support. For instance, during the Second World War, the Rohingya sided with British while Myanmar's nationalists supported the Japanese. Following the war, the British rewarded the Rohingya with

prestigious government posts. However, they were not given an autonomous state.

Since the beginning of independence, the national government of Burma and the military as predominant political actors still faced many political turmoil and instability caused by foreign threats. Foreign threats, such as Chinese Nationalist and Chinese Communist troops, were trying to get influence towards political factions and political forces in Burma. The experience of long-time struggle against British colonization also makes Burma tend to act guarded and cautious even easily to hold some hostilities against “the others”.

Political turmoil and foreign interventions for a decade since independence mixed with experience of being colonized for centuries have made the Burmese have a desire to have some strong, stable and authoritative state. As the result, in 1958 the military won the favor to take control of the government that later transform into junta military era that last for over almost four decades. With the military regime pattern, the state was likely to show their greatness against foreigners and entities that considered as colonial legacy such as Rohingya.

Since the independence of Myanmar in 1948, the Prime Minister U Nu has acknowledged the existence of Rohingya as Myanmar citizens. In the reign of Prime Minister U Ba Swe in 1959 was considered stable. Shortly, after General Ne Win and his Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) seized power in 1962, the government began to dissolve Rohingya social and political organizations (Human Rights Watch, 2000). In 1977, Burmese immigration and military authorities conducted what they called Operation *Nagamin* (Dragon King), a national effort to register citizens and screen out foreigners prior to a national census (Human Rights Watch, 2000).

Rohingya have received discriminatory treatment from Myanmar government, ranging from the application of the citizenship law in 1982 to military operations and torture carried out by the Myanmar military junta. Myanmar Citizenship Law which was formed in 1982 is known as the Citizenship of Law

1982. This Citizenship Law was formed by the Myanmar junta government shortly after the return of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar in 1979 which previously carried out an exodus to Bangladesh in 1978. Before the application of 1982 Citizenship Law, Myanmar had used The Union Citizenship (Election) Act 1948 and The Union Citizenship Act as legal rules governing citizenship.

Citizenship is related to the fulfillment of rights and obligations. If an individual does not have citizenship, he or she cannot get the rights that automatically obtained by a citizen, including Rohingya ethnic groups. In addition, Rohingya ethnic groups in matter of fact get discriminatory treatment with the establishment of rules specifically aimed at Rohingya ethnic groups. The discriminatory treatment covers the areas of public services, such as education, marriage, and the space for movement.

According to the three categories within the Citizenship law, Rohingya ethnic groups were not included in any category. This 1982 Citizenship Law is considered as detrimental to Rohingya ethnicity and is discriminatory against these ethnic groups. In 1989, Myanmar Government introduced Citizens Scrutiny Cards. The cards have different colors depending on the type of citizenship they have. Pink represents full citizenship, blue represents association citizenship, and green represents naturalized citizenship. Rohingya was not included within the list of 135 origin races that formed Myanmar or Burma. They did not get any card and they were classified as stateless.

The official history of the Myanmar government stated, Rohingya had “illegally” entered the Rakhine area in Myanmar after the Anglo-Myanmar war in 1824. Rohingya had previously entered Arakan in the 12th and 15th centuries. In 1784, the King of Burma Bodawpaya occupied Arakan region to expand the power of the Kingdom of Burma. At that time, the Kingdom of Burma was the strongest kingdom in the Indochina region. In the British colonial era, the British-Burmese colonial government relocated a number of Hindus from India into the Arakan

region and the inter-ethnic tensions had begun since then.

Since the enactment of the law, Rohingya experienced terrible treatment from the Myanmar government by being placed on the border between Myanmar and Bangladesh without citizenship recognition. Rohingya lived on the border in Arakan area alongside majority Buddhist Rakhine, while the Rohingya ethnic are moslems. When a racial conflict between Rohingya and Rakhine exploded in Arakan, Myanmar government supported Rakhine by creating anti-Rohingya sentiment. As the Myanmar government does not acknowledge the existence of Rohingmya, this event has also become a momentum for military government to expel Rohingya from Myanmar.

Rohingya was given a hardship to travel to other regions. They even needed to pay some amounts of money to the officer when they had to travel to the other villages. If they exceeded the time limit of their *travel pass*, they would be forbidden to return to their origin and be banished from the family list. Moreover, Rohingya had limited access to other services, such as education and health (Lewa, 2012, p. 11-13).

In May 1978, more than 200,000 Rohingyas fled to Bangladesh. The Myanmar authority stressed the Rohingya's illegal status in Myanmar. Refugees reported that Myanmar army had forcibly evicted them and alleged widespread army brutality, rape, and murder (Human Rights Watch, 2000). The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Bangladesh government supplied emergency were relieved but quickly overwhelmed as well. The Bangladesh government requested assistance from the United Nations and soon thirteen camps for the refugees were established along the border (Human Rights Watch, 2000).

Violence and discrimination against Rohingya ethnic groups even occurred when the military junta regime changed from Ne Win to the new military junta regime in 1988. In 1990, Rohingya were given the right to vote in the first general election during the military junta. They mostly voted in Arakan and supported

Aung San Suu Kyi who won the general election. However, the military junta regime rejected the results and sent troops throughout Myanmar to prevent civil unrest, one of the military operations aimed at the Rohingya ethnic group in Arakan. During the period of 1991 to 1992, they suffered torture and rape carried out by the Myanmar military. Besides, around 260,000 Rohingyas were left to live in refugee camps on the Myanmar border with Bangladesh without the attention of the Myanmar government.

In the early of 1990s, the government imposed special rules related to marriage for Moslems. Every bride had to wait for a long period of time to get married and they needed to bribe the government officials if they wanted a faster administrative process. The rule was also included for prohibition of free sex for Rohingya. Despite it was not based under the national law, the violations against this discriminative rule can be sanctioned by ten years in prison. In 1994, Myanmar military government officially stopped issuing birth certificates for Rohingya ethnic.

In 1995, Rohingya was granted a Temporary Registration Cards (white card) by Government of Myanmar as a response the intensive advocacy from UNHCR against Rohingya discrimination (Lewa, 2012, p. 11-13). However, this card did not have a great significance meaning for their citizenship status. The card could not be used for citizenship claims and it only recorded the family list and date of birth without including the place of birth. In other words, this card only listed the Rohingya for administrative matters instead of citizenship acknowledgement.

In 1998, Myanmar under Prime Minister Khin Nyunt stated to UNHCR that Rohingya was not an original ethnic of Myanmar. The prime minister considered them as illegal migrants that stayed in Myanmar from Bangladesh. In 2009, Myanmar government published an article published in Myanmar newspaper "New Light of Myanmar" in which the article stated that Myanmar did not acknowledge Rohingya ethnic as part of its origins (Lewa, 2012, p. 11-13).

The violence against Rohingyas is still continuing up until now. In 2013 BBC Interview, State Chancelor as well as woman activist Aung San Suu Kyi said that attacks on Rohingya is not an ethnic genocide, as she stressed that the fear was in the both sides Rohingyas and Burmans as the number of Moslem heavily increased in Myanmar (Aung San Suu Kyi, 2013). Suu Kyi said that both sides (Buddish and Moslems) are equally suffering, when the interviewer said that there were 150,000 homeless Moslems because of the conflict, Suu Kyi immediately imply that there are also a countless of Buddish refugees near the Border of Thailand (Aung San Suu Kyi, 2013). Suu Kyi's perspective as a pro-democratic elite clearly represented on how the Myanmar's elites view over Rohingya.

Citizenship law 1982 violates numbers of international law principal. The relationship between individual and law, as the individual only can get protection from the state through citizenship status. A collective or individual without citizenship will lose their fundamental rights, such as the right to freely move within a territory, educational rights, and property ownership rights. By the denial of Myanmar government over Rohingya, the Rohingya will not have access to law in any occasion, including international law. The status of Rohingya in this citizenship law has strengthened the view of "us" and "other", as well as the manifestation of for how the majority see the Rohingya.

The state of Myanmar does not listen to Rohingya's voice and never considers their interests. The Myanmar government actually committed human rights violations, because basically every human being deserves to have citizenship status, and it is fundamental things for every people. Myanmar government clearly excludes Rohingya from citizenship and only considers them as illegal migrants despite they had lived in Arakan for a long time.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) has highlighted this issue by including it in one of its points, namely article 24 stating that every child has the right to obtain citizenship. Besides, the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness also obliged

the state to give the citizenship status to every people who born within their territory regardless of their conditions (UNHCR, 2012). Despite Myanmar is not the part of The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and The Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. Myanmar deliberately violates human rights by let the Rohingya stateless since the rights of citizenship are the part of human rights.

CONCLUSION

In both countries, oppression against the minority is related to historical context. Indonesia, as a newly post-colonial state, considers Papua as an object, an uncivilized savage that needs to be civilized and to learn modernization from Indonesia. Indonesia made such a great effort to integrate Papua into its territory, including international lobbying. However, the Indonesian view of otherness toward Papua with equal treatment did not happen as Indonesia treated them differently compared to other Indonesian majority, especially Javanese. The discrimination of Papua especially happened on economy, as the New Order Indonesia regime let the migrants from outside Papua to run the business and working the fields. Papuans are considered as 'second citizen' that placed under the domination of majority. Indonesia claimed they tend to develop Papua through modernization and introduction of technology since New Order era. On the contrary, the native Papuans were excluded from the development.

After the collapse of New Order, the new "reformasi" regime tends to give autonomy to Papua to govern themselves and determine their own policy through the special autonomy (OTSUS). However, the program still has paradox in practice. OTSUS is more likely to enrich Papuan elites but far to reach Papuans grassroots yet. The prosperity is mostly enjoyed by the Papuan elites who hold the legislative or executive office rather than bring the prosperity to the rest of Papuans. Many observers said this phenomenon as "Papuans eats Papuans".

In Myanmar, the Rohingya ethnic discrimination was also related to historical context.

Rohingya existence in Myanmar was a legacy of British Burma policy. The newly post-colonial state of Burma, later Myanmar treated the Rohingyas totally as outsiders. Unlike British Burma policy that favorable to Rohingyas, the Myanmar state policy shows their hostility toward Rohingyas existence, as shown under 1982 citizenship law that has no recognition toward Rohingya as citizen.

The “otherness” view is the key of why people being marginalized or sub-alternate. The consciousness of both countries as “self” did not consider the subalterned as part of them. Both Papua and Rohingya are considered as “other” outside the “self”. In both countries, Papua and Rohingya, minority ethnic is always seen as the other rather than real part of the nation

The most significant distinction between both countries is the recognition and the type of otherness they suffer. In Indonesia, the nation insists Papua to be in their territory, while the Papuan people within are still considered as second citizens or as the objects that need to be civilized by majority of Indonesians. Whereas in Myanmar, the Rohingyas totally treated as outsiders albeit the citizenship laws has no recognition them as part of the Myanmar.

In Indonesian case, the “reformasi” movement has changed the government behavior in treating Papua. Special autonomy policy (*Otonomi Khusus*) is an effort to include the native Papuans in the development, despite the problems like only Papuans elite who can enjoy prosperity and power to run the government. In Myanmar, post military junta government inherits the hostility to Rohingya, until today, the problems of Rohingya remains the same, as they are not recognized by the government as the citizen of Myanmar. Moreover, genocides by the government against Rohingya are happening up to now.

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Interview

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