

FISH-BOMBING FISHERMAN FROM PULAU BARANG LOMPO, SOUTH SULAWESI PROVINCE: *Corruption and Policy for Reducing Destructive Fishing*

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ABSTRACT

At present, corruption in the fishing sector has become a severe threat to the effectiveness of marine resource management. However, corruption activities that occur in fishing communities are still rarely revealed to the public due to the complexity and lack of researchers who are interested in learning them. The research aims to understand the behavior of the fish-bomb fishermen in Barang Lompo Island, South Sulawesi, in order to arrange suitable policy and program choice for reducing of using fish bombs in fishing activity. This research is conducted by a qualitative approach and ethnography method (participation observation) as well in a time series since 1999. The result showed that the corruption behaviors among the Barang Lompo fishermen are caused by several factors, i.e., aggressive culture, poverty, cultural burden and cultural pride, and consumerism. Corruption, in this case, makes a fishing business more efficient, with short working time indicators, and catches a lot.

Keywords: fish bombing, workforce network, corruption, South Sulawesi

ABSTRAK

Saat ini, korupsi di sektor perikanan telah menjadi ancaman besar bagi efektivitas pengelolaan sumber daya laut. Namun, kegiatan korupsi yang terjadi di komunitas nelayan masih jarang terungkap kepada publik karena kompleksitas dan kurangnya peneliti yang tertarik untuk mempelajarinya. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk memahami perilaku nelayan ikan bom di Pulau Barang Lompo, Sulawesi Selatan, dalam rangka menyusun kebijakan dan pilihan program yang sesuai untuk mengurangi penggunaan bom ikan dalam kegiatan penangkapan ikan. Penelitian ini dilakukan dengan pendekatan kualitatif dan metode etnografi (observasi partisipasi) serta dalam deret waktu sejak 1999. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa perilaku korupsi di kalangan nelayan Barang Lompo disebabkan oleh beberapa faktor, yaitu budaya agresif, kemiskinan, budaya beban dan kebanggaan budaya, dan konsumerisme. Korupsi, dalam hal ini, membuat bisnis perikanan lebih efisien, dengan indikator waktu kerja yang pendek, dan hasil tangkapan yang banyak.

Kata kunci: pemboman ikan, jaringan tenaga kerja, korupsi, Sulawesi Selatan

INTRODUCTION

Similar to on land, efforts to bribe law enforcement officials at sea are also common. However, academics and government are academics, and governments pay less attention to this phenomenon (Sundstrom, 2012) so that efforts to investigate, prevent or take action against corruption in the ocean is very minimalist. The consequences of corruption at sea have caused massive over-exploitation and illegal services (Da Rocha et al., 2012; Zaelany, 2007).

So many fish caught have surpassed the maximum sustainable yield. For example, it is suspected that more than 30% of potential fisheries in Europe have been harvested beyond biological limits due to overfishing. As a result, since 2002, multiannual recovery and management plans with clear objectives and regulations on fisheries exploitation have become the core of conservation policy. It was only at the end of 2010, about 25% of the potential fisheries could be considered in multiannual plans and fishing regulations. It means that these fish populations can increase and produce more economic output and profits if they are not captured within a few years (Da Rocha et al., 2012).

Cases in Indonesia are more or less similar; over-exploitation and illegal fisheries have degenerated fishery products. The Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries Susi Pudjiastuti made a breakthrough with the policy of sinking foreign vessels caught in illegal fishing. His strict actions prohibit destructive fishing tools such as trawling, *cantrang*, fish bombs, and potassium cyanide. Besides, he also streamlined regulations by compiling implementing regulations.

According to Froese (in Da Rocha et al., 2012), the lack of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) success was mainly due to collusion between fishery products traders and government officials. Besides, and more importantly, enforcement of surveillance management by the state is weak, with cases where the actual catch exceeds the agreed amount of sustainable fisheries. Furthermore, Froese also said that for effective law that is complied with by fisheries workers, a law is required with harsh sanctions.

It is an essential component of conservation policies that are successful in management.

Corruption in the fishing sector has become a serious threat to the effectiveness of marine resource management. In the FAO publication, the Fisheries Guidebook, it was stated that if the community considers fisheries stakeholders to be involved in the corruption cycle, this will affect the compliance of the fishermen. Furthermore, corruption has been described as having severe welfare implications because millions of US dollars are lost every year due to the distortion of trade in products originating from bribery of law enforcement officials. However, despite calls for the adverse effects of corruption and its widespread presence in public administration in developing countries, empirical investigations into the impact of corruption are generally missing in the literature regarding the management of marine resource exploitation.

Uncertainty in fishermen's business has encouraged fishers to invest in labor and technology (Oliver, ed. 2002). One example of this type of investment is the use of technology that is suspected of damaging marine ecosystems (destructive technology) (Burke, 2002; Destructive Fishing Watch, 2004; Pet-Soede, L., and M.V.Erdmann.1998).

The use of destructive technology is illegal and declared prohibited in Law number 31 of 2004. Law enforcement officials refer to it as illegal service or illegal activities, and academics often refer to it as destructive services (Zaelany, 2006). The sanctions are hefty, both in the form of prison sentences and huge fines. In the Law number 31 of 2004 in conjunction with Law number 45 of 2009 concerning Article 100B Fisheries, the perpetrators of this destructive service will be sentenced to a maximum of 1 (one) year imprisonment or a maximum fine of Rp. 250,000,000 (two hundred fifty million rupiahs). The illegal nature of these services includes at least two things: 1) trade in material from illegal fishing equipment, such as fish bomb materials, and of course, 2) illegal fishing gear use. Applying this destructive technology is not stopped and even more prevalent (Zaelany,

2003). The causes include (Zaelany, 2007) the alleged corruption activities carried out by a handful of law enforcers who uses the work of fishers who use destructive fishing gear and capital owners who utilize fishermen's poverty.

Corruption is interpreted as any form of abuse of office or public power to gain personal gain (Nas, Price, and Weber, 1986). The implementation of corruption can be done in the office or outside the office while doing work or outside of work time. The authority possessed by a person can also be capital, which is used to obtain additional profits or income illegally. Corruption in Indonesia is often described as a tangled thread that is difficult to decipher (Sadi, 2018). Corruption activities occur outside the office and in fishing communities are still rarely revealed, because of the complexity of the problems and the lack of researchers who are interested in learning them. Corruption behavior that occurs in fisheries activities does not always have a negative impact, there is also a positive impact on the efficiency of business operations, in the sense of increasing the income of fishermen (Nas, Price and Weber, 1986; Bardhan, 1997).

The purpose of the paper is to analyze corruption activities that occur during fishing activities. To that end, this paper uses the fishermen and fishing practices from Barang Lompo Island, South Sulawesi Province. Fishers using fish bombs on Barang Lompo Island are called *Pa'es* fishermen. This research was conducted in a time series by using a qualitative approach and applying ethnographic methods (observation participation) since 1999. This article is only part of the results of the research that has been done.

THEORETICAL APPROACH

When a group of fishermen wants to make an effort to search for fish destructively, for example, by using fish bombs as the tool, in fact, there has been negative emotional self-talk in him, which is supported by cognitive knowledge (especially

culture). Knowledge of habits, norms, cultural values, where good and bad behavior and the behavior of other parties towards business services are considerations that form the basis for fishers in making decisions (Zaelany, 2007).

Moreover, fishermen will also discuss with their friends, who are shipmen in searching for sea products (Zaelany, 2007), about how to be able to obtain many results with minimal costs and risks as small as possible. Indeed, the role of *Punggawa* (leader of a group of fishermen, the owner of the capital) has a considerable role that significantly influences the course of group discussions (Pelras, 2000). The considerations made in this discussion are based on the adaptation of existing systems in the group (Kohl, 1991).

The negatively emotional state of mind of fishermen determines whether they take part in the network of corruption or not.

In a sense, the will join the *Pa'es* group (fishermen using fish bombs) or not, whether to give bribes or give some money requested by unscrupulous law enforcement officers or not (D'andrade, 1995). All decisions will be taken, taking into account the costs that must be incurred for persons must be lower than the results to be obtained.

At the *Punggawa* level, something similar also becomes a struggle in his mind. Is it profitable or not to develop fishermen's business with fish bombs? What if caught by law enforcement officers? Cultural values that prioritize success in the culture of Barang Lompo Island people encourage them to take these risks. *Punggawa* will prepare a strategy to minimize the risks that might occur by calculating the opportunities that exist in the *Pa'es* fishermen business but provides maximum benefits to the retainer.

The post-structuralist approach can be used to approach the phenomenon of fisherman adaptation strategies. The myth that the poor are environmentally destructive is now considered inadequate. Local people also have environmental adaptations which in their way, make improvements to environmental degradation (local wisdom, the second round of common property) (Hardin, 1968). The idea

that began to be built in this perspective is that, in general, 'the rich will use more resources and have a far greater impact than the poor' (Forsyth, 2003). Based on this idea, social exploitation in fishing communities is very important to study.

The different views of the parties (government, fishermen, traders, law enforcers) about the activities of fishermen using fish bombs often cause "more difficulties" to solve problems. Each party insists on the truth of its perspective and considers the other party guilty, unmanageable, unwilling to follow the right, stupid, destructive, and other ways. This kind of attitude has been observed by social scientists, especially anthropologists, as the cause of the failure of various development programs. Failure to understand the reason someone chooses a particular attitude is one of the inhibiting factors in determining the steps to compromise to find solutions to smooth development (D'Andrade, 1995).

Cognitive factors, which is how a person understands his environment and behaves according to his understanding, is one aspect that attracts the attention of social scientists. Then comes the concept of the emic view and etic view (Kohl, 1991). Emic is interpreted as the way the local community views its environment or the problems it faces, whereas ethics is an 'outsider' view of the local community and the problems faced by the local community. Often emic and etic produce different perceptions. The difference arises due to various things, such as limited knowledge of outsiders on aspects understood by local communities, differences in interests, and differences in cultural background.

If the other party carries out development somewhere, they need to understand the understanding of the local community. When different interests arise, a compromise must be made immediately without coercion. The imposition of unilateral interests will only lead to considerable resistance to development efforts. Finally, the issue of cultural differences should be approached by not prioritizing one's own culture. In this case, understanding the cultural categories of society is very important.

One of the critical questions in destructive fishing is whether fishing using bombs is a big mistake or not. For law enforcers and fisheries authority, fishing with bombs is a crime with sanctions for imprisonment and classified as illegal activities, as the eradication of illegal logging is often carried out along with fishing operations for destructive users such as fish bombs and cyanide in South Sulawesi Province. Meanwhile, for fishers, this activity is a violation, not a crime. From the perspective of fishermen's culture, stealing is a crime, consuming liquor and going to prostitution is delinquency that is worse than the violation of the use of fish bombs. The use of destructive technology to catch fish is more aimed at earning a living for the family because it is considered a better value.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Barang Lompo Island which is one of the islands of the Spermonde Islands, which is located west of Makassar. The fishermen intensively used fish bombs as a technology for fishing in the 1990s. Some things can be stated as a discussion of this study, namely identifying things that cause the Paeses service system to exist for years (see Figure 1). There are three levels of causes. The *first level* is an internal factor, which is a push factor for fishers to choose fish bomb fishing jobs. These factors are: aggressive culture, poverty, cultural burden, and cultural pride, and consumerism

1. Aggressive Culture

The cultural value system in the community glorifies aggressiveness and courage. It can be seen in the existing service rituals, as well as the symbols related to the aggressiveness in trying, courage, skills, as in the ceremonies of birth, pregnancy, and marriage.

2. Poverty Factor

The characters are as follows: 1) low education, 2) high operating costs for fishing, with fuel prices and supplies rising steadily periodically; the price has multiplied compared to the usual price, because the cost of supplies is often paid after the operation of fishing (*res*), 3) the price of goods for daily necessities on the island is very high compared to prices in Makassar, 4)

high population density with growth rates high population because the number of children is quite large.

3. Cultural Burden

which is early marriage followed by marriage costs in the form of 'uang naik' is very expensive, and becomes a pride for a man if he can pay for his own 'uang naik' without the help of parents and relatives (cultural pride), and;

4. Consumptive (Consumption)

The first level, consumptive behavior among the fishermen manifests in various forms, namely 1) high consumption of cigarettes 2) negatively overuse of mobile phones and motorbikes on the island 3) a costly personal necessity for fishing operations 3) extravagant lifestyle and spending habits (expensive restaurants, alcohol/ liquor, and prostitution).

The second level is the interaction of exploitation between fishermen and *Punggawa*, and fishers with law enforcement. Because of the working relationship built through debt (debt working relationship) between fishermen and *Punggawa*, the consequence is that fish prices are determined unilaterally by *Punggawa Pulau, Punggawa TPI, and Punggawa Darat*, so that the price of fish caught by fishermen is low. Multilevel interactions between fishers and *Punggawa* starting from the island to the city of Makassar, gave rise to capital flows and the flow of fish bomb material to fishermen, demanding fisherman loyalty, although, in practice, it was exploitative relations. The fishermen protect the *Punggawa* from the pursuit of security officers, and the fishermen work optimally in the effort to catch fish because this concerns the sustainability of their business.

The exploitative interactions also occur between fishermen-*Punggawa* with law enforcers. Interactions that are built on pseudo working relationships to find fish using a fish bomb. Law enforcers take part in guarding the illegal trade in fish bomb material, letting fishermen use fish bombs, and even notifying fishers if there is an operation to search for fish bomb material. For the services, law enforcers get 'security money' from fishermen.




Figure 1. The Flow of the Fish Bomb Service Phenomenon

Fertilizers for fish bombs originated from Malaysia, which was managed by several Malaysian *Punggawa* and entered Indonesia through the Pare-pare Port for later regulated by Pare-Pare *Punggawa*. The fertilizer is not solely for the ingredients of fish bomb makers, but fertilizers that can be used for agricultural activities, especially to fertilize oil palm plants, reportedly to spur oil palm growth. Fishermen on Barang Lompo Island tell us that the fertilizer is of high quality when it is used for any plant, will flourish. Even if the fertilizer is sown in ponds or ponds, it will make the fish grow bigger and faster.

Fertilizer buying is not allowed for everyone, but only farmer groups can buy the fertilizer. Besides, in the Pare-pare port, there are also many polices in overseeing fertilizer purchases. Therefore, the occurrence of purchases by illegal traders allegedly due to cooperation (between

those in charge of taking care and overseeing the distribution of fertilizers) with illegal traders. It happens because fertilizer sales have a significant profit. Fertilizer prices outside the port can be three-four times high.

From Pare-pare Port, fertilizer will be distributed to various places in the South Sulawesi province. One of the main destinations of this fertilizer distribution is the city of Makassar, as the center of illegal trade in fish bomb materials and also to Galesong and Sinjai. Furthermore, from the city of Makassar, the fertilizer, along with axes and detonators, was sent to various other places, including to various islands in the Spermonde Islands. Trading of materials for fish bomb makers is carried out in strict confidence and only known to certain people (Hasbullah, 2006).

This discussion shows that the hypothesis that many parties have believed so far about the reason fishermen use destructive technology is not entirely appropriate. Factors such as poverty, ignorance, and ignorance driven by greed have not been enough to encourage fishers to use destructive capture technology for many years.

This strategy for changing destructive fishing practices should begin with efforts to stop the illegal trade in fish bomb materials. There is always negative emotional self-talk among the fishermen when they will buy materials to make fish bombs or when sailing to use them. They realized that the use of fish bombs is forbidden. When this research was carried out, many times, the illegal trading halt operations were carried




Figure 2 The Flow of Bomb material and models of service activities ranging from the primary strata in Pare-pare to the fishermen of Pa'es

out, and the results were that fish bomb material was challenging to obtain by fishers. It may still be obtained in limited quantities, but the price was costly, so fishers were forced to stop their business. They did not do any service because there were no other fishing gear or the skills to use other fishing equipment. It is because they have not used the fishing gear for a long time other than fish bombs.

The efforts to stop the illegal trade of fish bomb materials have generally been only on islands, which are on the third strata of the illegal trade chain. There are almost no efforts made to stop the illegal trade on the second strata (i.e., in the cities of Makassar, Galesong, Sinjai) and the first strata in the city of Pare-pare which is the entry point for fertilizer material from Malaysia. When this research was underway, efforts were made to stop the illegal trade in the second strata, and as a result, fishermen had difficulty obtaining fish bomb material.

The strategy is not just to stop illegal trading but must be followed by various other supporting programs. It has to be the right policy of the central government and led directly by officials at the ministerial level to stop the illegal trading because regional officials are proven unable. Business services by using destructive technology are sustainable because of corruption. If corruption can be eradicated, it will be easy to stop the illegal trade in fish bomb-making materials. From the results of the research, it is proven that if the fisheries management and law enforcement 'want' will be able to stop the illegal trade of fish bomb-making materials, which means it will stop destructive fishing.

One of the social capital often been neglected in changing destructive fishing on Barang Lompo Island is sustainable fishing. It has never been an intensive approach to the *Punggawa* and assisting them in finding alternative jobs or environmentally friendly fishing gear. If the approach to *Punggawa* is successful, and they can accept the idea conveyed, it might make the *Sawi* (the crew) will soon follow in the steps of the *Punggawa*. During this time, the *Punggawa* were 'hostile'

by program activists because of the tendency to reject their programs. An intensive personal approach to the *Punggawa* will produce results if it is taken seriously.

Therefore, the hypothesis that fishermen using destructive technology is actually the potential to turn into sustainable fishers by observing the socio-cultural aspects and conducting efforts to empower fishermen systematically is correct in the sense that it can be pursued.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Eradicating destructive fishing has to be the main homework and intense effort in stopping the illegal trade in fish-bomb material. But, Such effort alone is inadequate. Hence, the subsequent effort need to do is changing the destructive fishing to sustainable practices through the implementation of community-based management programs (Crawford et al., 2000; Nikijuluw, 2002). Those programs have to concern about establishing marine protected areas, developing friendly-productive-activities environment, and strengthening an institution that allows stakeholders to play an active role.

There are at least three methods that can be developed in community-based management for policymaking: methods of imitation, changes in cognition, and modeling. The purpose of these three methods is so that stakeholders have the same opinion (shared understanding) about the types of fishing gear, damage to marine natural resources, types of violations, and problem-solving (solutions). The ultimate goal, of course, is to change the behavior of the fish bomb service providers.

Indonesians love to imitate, for example, through visualization. If a film is shown on video or TV about the effects of misconduct and what should be the behavior, it can be imitated. We can also visualize or display an example (model) or the workings of foreign fishermen, for example, fishermen from the United States that are exemplary. The most important thing is the change in cognition. This requires great curiosity. If there is a strong curiosity, then

changes will be made for the scheme of thinking about how fishermen should work. Changes in impaired cognition such as those have been worked on for generations from their ancestors. This process of change can be supported by information such as the destruction of the ecosystem. There is no inheritance for the next generation, the difficulty of finding large fish because the use of fish bombs has made small fish die. This change in cognition essentially requires sufficient intelligence / intellectual factors so that curiosity can be grown, then the schema in cognition is changed as it should. Imitation methods and modeling methods are more comfortable to apply in behavioral change efforts.

Implementation of the agenda, for now, should be led directly by the Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries. That is because public trust in officials in the regions is in deficit. Local government bureaucracy and law enforcers are not authoritative because the population regards them as 'tribute collectors' from the community, even those who should be tasked with eradicating this matter, instead use it for their own benefit.

Besides, the problem of implementing various existing programs is not participatory. Most programs only reach local elites, in which donations in the form of goods and funds stop for them only (local term: *uang mati*). For example, the problem of establishing a Marine Protected Area (*Daerah Perlindungan Laut*) and providing various assistance from the Marine and Fisheries Agency and from the local government, which most residents do not know about and are only enjoyed by several local elites.

The approach used so far is coercive. It only prohibits, captures, and punishes without considering the welfare of the community. It results in the marginalization of fishermen. Instead, the approach used must be changed with an approach based on participatory programs that incorporate the issue of community welfare as its orientation. The 'destructive' attitude (deteriorating the work of fish bombers and not associating with the community) in prohibiting fishermen from doing 'destructive fishing' will

not cause sympathy. Instead, an antipathy attitude arises. So far, such attitudes have arisen in efforts to stop the practice of using fish bombs (destructive attitude when asking fishermen to switch to environmentally friendly technology).

The entrance for the implementation of this program should be "escorted" by a cultural mediator, namely someone who is well known to the people of the island and is socially very well received by the community. Without this, it would be very challenging to carry out these programs in communities belonging to the bond group with the main characteristics of low trust to other parties. The most effective social capital used as a channel for terminating destructive fishing programs on this island is the *Punggawa*. If they agree that they will stop doing destructive fishing, the crew will also follow the changes made by the *Punggawa*. Cultural mediators should be people who can bridge the program activists with these retainers.

Meetings should be held in the houses of *Punggawa*, not in the village head's office or elsewhere, because of their different opinion. If the meeting is held at the *Punggawa* house, all the *Sawi* will be present, and the atmosphere of the meeting will be more ease. During this time, the meetings were held in official places such as village offices (*Kantor kelurahan*) or in the fish auction office (*Tempat Pelelangan Ikan*), which retainers often were absent and one crew member only represented courtier.

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