

META-ANALYSIS AS A RESEARCH TOOL: A Systematic Review of Bibliometric Studies In Political Dynasty

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Abstract

Political dynasty practice in many democracy countries and sign of the flaws of democratic political systems in recent decades. It shows the inequality of justice, a crisis of trust, and democratic legal policies because families or groups controlled the government. The bibliographic review study examines the theory and practice of political dynasty in democratic countries through a different approach from the previous one, namely through literature studies of many Scopus indexed scientific articles from qualified researchers in the political field. Systematically bibliometric review can examine the study comprehensively and complete. The analysis uses VOSviewer and Nvivo to create linkage of the topic, grouping theme, mapping the dominant theme of a political dynasty. Based on cluster analysis with NVivo 12 plus sourced from 60 Scopus indexed articles, there are six clusters and five main topics about dynastic politics in a democratic country.

Keywords: Bibliometric; Democracy; Nvivo; Political Dynasty; VOSviewer.

Abstrak

Praktek politik dinasti terjadi di beberapa negara demokrasi dan menjadi tanda kelemahan sistem politik demokratis dalam beberapa dekade terakhir. Hal itu menunjukkan ketidaksetaraan keadilan, krisis kepercayaan, dan kebijakan hukum yang demokratis karena hanya dinasti keluarga atau sekelompok orang yang mengendalikan pemerintah. Studi tinjauan bibliografi ini menganalisis teori dan praktik dinasti politik di negara-negara demokratis melalui pendekatan yang berbeda dari yang sebelumnya, yaitu melalui studi literatur dari banyak artikel ilmiah yang diindeks Scopus dari para peneliti yang memenuhi syarat di bidang politik. Tinjauan bibliometrik secara sistematis dapat memeriksa penelitian ini secara komprehensif dan lengkap. Analisis ini menggunakan Vosviewer dan Nvivo untuk membuat hubungan topik, tema pengelompokan, memetakan tema dominan dari dinasti politik. Berdasarkan analisis menggunakan Nvivo 12 dari 60 artikel terindeks Scopus, penulis menemukan enam kluster dan lima topik utama yang dibahas ketika membicarakan soal politik dinasti di negara demokrasi.

Kata kunci: bibliografi; demokrasi; Nvivo; politik dinasti; VOSviewer.

INTRODUCTION

The practice of democracy in various countries has experienced many irregularities, one of which is the emergence of dynastic systems in democratic politics. The emergence of dynasties in democratic state politics reflects the imperfection of the administration of a democratic system, which results in an unequal distribution of power. Power is inherited in the same family, class, or group from period to period. Relatives or family ties contributed to the benefit of those who wanted power. Rubi (2019) wrote about the 'iron law of oligarchy, which states that in a democratic organization, people who have positions of power will continue to try to strengthen themselves in power and destroy democratic principles.

Political dynasties exist in democracies regardless of the country's history, structure, or level of economic development. Legislators and members of parliament with dynastic relations ranged from 6% in the United States to 37–40% in the Philippines and Mexico (Mendoza et al., 2012). In the case of the Philippines, if we also consider family relationships with local government units, the figure is up to 70%. About 80% of the youngest legislators in the Philippines also come from dynastic political families. However, dynasties across democracies differ in important ways. During the period between 1996 and 2007, more than 90% of Japanese politicians were men and about 30% of the Japanese parliament came from political dynasties. Girls are unlikely to be part of the country's political dynasties, as power is often passed on to boys. A recent study found that of the more than 120 Japanese politicians identified as dynastic, only three were females (Asako et al., 2015). On the other hand, one study of political dynasties in the US Congress shows how dynasties help improve gender balance in the US Congress, by allowing more women legislators to enter through their family ties (Aliotta, 2007).

Political dynasty is a field of study in the discipline of political science and government that has been widely studied by researchers. Previous research, such as the article from Mendoza, Cruz, and Alungal (2014), suggests that political dynasties are not new and have

occurred centuries ago. Several academics have also attempted to highlight the relationship between political dynasties and democracy (Mukti & Rodiyah, 2020; Romli et al., 2023). In his analysis, democracy, which is expected to strengthen civil society, instead provides opportunities for the continuation of political dynasties. Meanwhile, previous research has also attempted to analyze political dynasties at the provincial or district level (Villanueva, 2020; Romli et al., 2023). Political parties' strong position, low education levels, and weak civil society have allowed political dynasties to take deep root in various regions.

The research was conducted with various focuses and approaches, but nothing has been done with a systematic study approach. Previous research has usually used field data, using qualitative and quantitative approaches (Viro-la et al., 2016) as an important theme involving various stakeholders, some of them political practitioners. There needs to research on dynastic politics using a bibliographic approach. This technique aims to develop theoretical knowledge that reveals the level of abstraction, in the hope of gaining a greater perspective of application in practical situations. In addition, it can reconstruct a large number of studies to link the results and achieve the representation of the phenomenon of political dynasties in the world.

The Theoretical Concept of Political Dynasty

Democracy is widely said to be capable of facilitating and sustaining a broader and more inclusive process of economic and human development. More predictable long-term economic growth enhanced macroeconomic stability, more realistic management of economic and political shocks and crises, and stronger distributional results are consistent with political democracy. In theory, democracy guarantees an equal voice in government decision-making through various mechanisms such as one person and one vote, equality in political participation, and free speech. Democracy has the potential to develop an environment that is responsive to the needs of its

citizens which, often, results in higher levels of human capital investment and more inclusive and equitable social and economic outcomes. However, underdeveloped democratic institutions can be associated with weak political participation and thus result in, in some cases, political dynasties. However, political dynasties can exist in any democracy regardless of their structure. A brief survey of the literature shows that the share of legislators with past dynastic ties to parliament ranges from as low as 6% in the United States (Bó et al., 2009) or 10% in Argentina (Rosser-Owen, 2014) to as high as 37–40% in Japan and Mexico (Asako et al., 2015). In the case of the Philippines, the share of political dynasties is estimated to be between 50% (Querubin, 2016) and 70% (Geys, 2017a) when links to local government units are taken into account.


It is assumed that the emergence of political dynasties indicated a decline in political equality and that the resulting political monopoly led to a deterioration in socio-economic results that prevented people from communicating their needs effectively to the government (Tusalem & Pe-Aguirre, 2013). In addition, dynastic officials can use state power for personal gain without fear of replacement or administrative sanctions. They also diverge in the selection of political leaders, thereby supporting those who are influential, possibly preventing the best and brightest from serving in government, and/or biased policies in favor of certain groups. However, an alternative view suggests that political dynasties provide reformers with an extension of time that allows for more effective planning and implementation of policies with long-term goals. Politicians with shorter terms of office are often subject to populist demands and avoid difficult but needed reforms that bear fruit in the future, and are critical to sustainable, strong, and inclusive growth (Reyes et al., 2018). It is also possible that dynastic politicians have inheritance-related motivations that are closely tied to the overall outcome in their respective jurisdictions. Thus, the longer their tenure, the more likely they are to care about long-term outcomes. Alternatively, rent-seeking dynastic politicians, after recognizing the financial benefits of adopting growth-oriented

policies and strategies, may also be motivated to enact reforms that will result in large and sustainable economic growth in their own jurisdiction. The net effect of political dynasties on social and economic performance remains an empirical concern in this regard (Geys, 2017b).

Dynastic politicians, defined as those whose family members have held similar positions in the past, occupy a sizeable portion of offices in many parts of the world (Isaev et al., 2020). Because of the important relationship between democratic institutions and a market economy, political inequality, in turn, can be an important factor behind other forms of inequality, including income inequality. Political inequality can strengthen itself because it can exacerbate economic and other forms of inequality. The result is a type of “low-level democratic balance” in which the mutually reinforcing forces of weak democratic institutions lead to poor economic outcomes and vice versa. Thus, studying political dynasties adds further empirical and theoretical insight to the broader analysis of the concept of political inequality (Ruud & Nielsen, 2018).

Various factors contributed to the emergence of political dynasties, including the high cost of candidacy, increasing influence of political lobbying, and factors affecting voting behavior such as remembering names (Purdey, 2016). As noted earlier, membership in political dynasties increases one’s chances of being elected to office and allows politicians to limit competition by excluding a large proportion of citizens from participating in political leadership roles. Once in a position of power, dynastic officials can (but need not) promote narrow class interests. Through imperfect information and voter disillusionment, voter participation can be further weakened (and political dynasties strengthened). Lack of political competition and the prevalence of social outcomes through political dynasties through at least three networks (M A Rossi, 2017). First, if the emergence of political dynasties prevents the majority of citizens from effectively communicating their needs to the government, it can prevent the government from responding to social and economic problems effectively. Misrepresentation (or inadequate represen-

Figure 1. Scientific Articles Based on Political Dynastic Themes



tation) of excluded groups can interfere with poverty reduction policies and income redistribution mechanisms, exacerbate poverty and income inequality, and ultimately jeopardize the government's capacity to provide the most needed public goods. Second, democratic institutions can be compromised if dynastic officials use state power for their own interests (M A Rossi, 2017). Finally, political dynasties can skew the election of political leaders in favor of those who are influential and prevent the best and brightest from serving in government to produce suboptimal policies and, ultimately, weak socio-economic outcomes (M A Rossi, 2017).

RESEARCH METHOD


The purpose of this study is to examine various scientific articles on the topic of dynastic politics in democratic countries that have been published in reputable international journals. The review article is aimed at conceptualizing the study of dynastic politics, which is explained in the following formulation of the problem, namely: (1) What are the dominant themes in the study of dynastic politics?

(2) How are the relationships and groupings of themes in dynastic politics?, (3) What are the topics related to the study of dynastic politics?, and (5) What concepts are used in the study of dynastic politics?. The questions are explained based on the topic of study, the framework, and previous research findings indexed in the Scopus database. The articles reviewed in this study went through the stages of searching for articles and mapping topics.

Articles are searched through the following stages. First, identify the article. This is done by publishing or destroying the software, using the Scopus database. Furthermore, at this stage the keyword "political dynasty" is entered in the article search column in the publish or perish application, and the publication year is limited between 2015 and 2020. The search results in views of 921 scientific articles that are relevant to the topic (Figure 1).

The stages of mapping in this study were carried out through the following process - first, the full-text articles were imported into VOSviewer and NVivo 12 plus software. This process is carried out to obtain data clusters, and visualize networks from the research theme. Meanwhile, the Nvivo 12 plus software is used to input the study topics, the relevance of the study themes, and the mapping, based

Figure 2. The Relationship of Themes in Dynastic Political Studies



on the focus of each article being analyzed. Second, articles are managed in the Nvivo 12 plus software, by classifying them by author, year, journal, and publisher name. Furthermore, this classification is done using the NVivo 12 plus database import feature.

The stages of data analysis and conceptualization are the stages of reviewing articles that produce data that can answer research questions. In addition, at this stage data analysis is focused on cluster analysis, dominant topics, linkages to themes, and mapping of dynastic political studies topics, based on the 60 articles analyzed. Finally, this analysis aims to produce a concept of dynastic political studies which is formulated based on the articles reviewed.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Linkages and Groupings of Themes in Political Dynasties

In this section, concepts are described in several visualizations related to the theme of this research, and 50 of them were identified in 383 articles. The results of the review with VOSviewer reveal that there are six concept

clusters. Figure 2 shows the concept names derived from the cluster density display. Furthermore, the color code used by each is used to see a list of concepts that stand out from each cluster. The aim is to identify as many themes as possible that are often discussed in previous research and to enable them to be used in future research. Based on Figure 2, it can be seen that the cluster density is distinguished by a different color from each cluster. Identification in the form of mapping in Figure 2 can help researchers, especially those who are just starting their research from scratch. When you find a topic of interest in a particular field of interest, you can read articles related to that topic with the help of this study.

Cluster 1 is related to the concept of dynastic politics, which is related to power that is passed down from generation to generation. Relevant articles as a reference include those written by Brian D. Feinstein (Feinstein, 2010), regarding *The Dynasty Advantage: Family Ties in Congressional Elections*. The study was conducted in the United States using the original dataset containing candidate and district level covariates for all candidates in the House open-seat contest between 1994 and 2006. The study found that dynastic politicians enjoyed a “brand name advantage,” giving them a significant advantage over their opponents.

Table 1. Grouping Themes in Political Dynasty Studies

Cluster	Concept Name	Total
Cluster 1	Child, Parent, Generation, Human Capital, Economy	131
Cluster 2	Law, Governance, Election, Corruption, Poverty, Political Dynasty	104
Cluster 3	Site, Environment, Factor, Scale, Condition, Dynastic Transition	61
Cluster 4	Impact, Control, Organization, Management, Firm, Family Business	37
Cluster 5	Communication, Behavior, Trust, Stability, Lack	31
Cluster 6	Connection, Marriage, Wife	19

Sources: Authors (2022).

comparable non-dynastic. On the other hand, hypotheses regarding the potential returns derived from past political experience and fundraising capabilities yield no results.

Cluster 2 is related to the concept of government and law in democratic countries. Research related to this theme is the research of Tusalem (Tusalem & Pe-Aguirre, 2013) on The effect of political dynasties on effective democratic governance: Evidence from the Philippines. The findings show how clan-dominated provinces tend not to experience good governance in terms of (a) growth of infrastructure, (b) health spending, (c) crime prevalence, (d) full jobs, and (e) overall government efficiency. The implications of the empirical analysis suggest that political dynasties have a detrimental effect on the allocation of public goods, even if their presence encourages more rights to congress.

Cluster 3 is related to environmental concepts and factors that influence power politics, and an example can be found in the article by Reyes, et. al (Reyes et al., 2018) with the title “Do money, power, family and connections really matter in politics? Analysis factors of success in 2010, 2013 and 2016 Philippine senatorial elections”. Reyes examined the relationship with the total number of votes for senatorial candidates for 2010, 2013, and 2016 elections, revealing that overall campaign expenditure has a very significant rela-

tionship with the number of votes, consistent with all the elections covered in the study. So money is very important - even when compared to factors that have traditionally been highly regarded such as office, political dynasty, and membership of political parties. This article examines the results in relation to the socio-political context of the Philippines and provides additional insights and implications of the findings.

Cluster 4 is a political management concept. Research on management conducted by Isaev et. al (Isaev et al., 2020) on “The “machine of power” and aspects of political balance.” The notion of the dynamic balance of power acts as a mandatory attribute of societal management and focuses political activity on the constant consideration of various phenomena, circumstances, and interests. the main instrument of political management, seeking to continue to strengthen its power both within and without, and to spread it more and more into new realms and areas of social relations. But over time, first of all, in the field of international law, universal principles recognized that establishes the limits of power and assumes the impossibility of strengthening the power of a country (the idea of a political balance of sovereign national states).In domestic politics, increasing levels of agreement and gradually developing consensus mechanisms contribute to a reduction in the role played by direct and

mun the emergence of an institutional system that is considered legitimate. The transition from a dynastic state to a bureaucracy eliminates the personalization of the “power machine”. Power organizations largely separate the bearers or subjects of power from their decisions. There is no visible mechanism of power and subordination and conflicting interests between the ruling and the ruled. Moreover, in the industrial revolution of the 20th century, the “power machine” was forced to adapt to a new social reality. This has led to the creation of a new management structure.

The concept of communication, trust, and risk in dynastic politics is mapped into cluster 5. Ruud & Nielsen (Ruud & Nielsen, 2018) in their research “Political Dynasticism: Networks, Trust, Risk” reveals dynastic politics as a political phenomenon that occurs in the South Asian region. Although political dynasticism has received a lot of attention at the national level, it is almost systematically neglected at the regional and local levels. In the article by Ruud & Nielsen (Ruud & Nielsen, 2018), political dynasticism at the local level is driven by conditions that are crucially different from the conditions that drive national politics. The research uses case studies and insights from the literature available both inside and outside South Asia to suggest that, comparatively speaking, three main elements stand out: reciprocity, trustworthiness, and failure. By investigating local cases ethnographically, the contribution demonstrates the highly relevant

facts of uncertain circumstances and decision-making procedures. In situations where reliable information is scarce, the dangers of misinformation and opportunities in useful information are real and clear, and a strong representation with a reliable network of peers benefits, especially if he can attract voters. The popular idea of leadership plays a role, as does violence. But in the end, non-transparent leadership made it possible to form a dynasty.

The theme mapped out in Cluster 6 is related to the influence of kinship relations in politics. Purdey’s (Purdey, 2016) research on “Narratives to power: The case of the Djojohadikusumo family dynasty over four generations”. This article presents an introductory work on the biographical study of one of Indonesia’s most prominent and enduring political dynasties, the Djojohadikusumo family, who have held positions of power in major national institutions for four generations. This study aims to improve our understanding of how this family has imagined itself in the political structure as they have shifted over four generations. What characteristics of the dynasty can be identified that allow it to adapt, how much external and structural power supports the dynasty as a central player, and how much it is sustained by characteristics that are internal, historical, psychological, and culturally specific to the family unit.


Dominant Themes in the Study of Political

Figure 3. Dominant Themes in the Study of Political Dynasty



Sources: Authors (2022).

Figure 4. Categorization of Themes in the Study of Dynastic Politics



Sources: Authors (2022).

Dynasties

Word Frequency Queries explores the words that appear most frequently in the research data. Therefore, with this analysis tool, words that have the same meaning can be categorized into one group. Based on the results of data analysis sourced from 60 articles, the dominant themes studied by previous researchers were politics, dynasty, parties, government, law, general elections, and power. Therefore, it can be interpreted that this is the overall focus of research related to this topic. This is further explained in (Figure 3), especially in bold words.

It is necessary to pay attention to words such as government, society, and institutions, which are also important, considering that politics is a very complex multidimensional system because it involves various interest groups. In addition, the complexity of the problem and the many actors involved cause many problems and interests, such as education, level of welfare, social and economic conditions of society.

Categorization of Themes in Dynastic Political Studies

Based on cluster analysis with NVivo 12 plus sourced from 60 Scopus indexed articles,

there are five main theme categorizations in dynastic political studies (Figure 4), namely politics, dynasty, family relations, general elections, and local issues. Furthermore, the results of categorizing the research themes show that the research on dynastic politics discusses the five themes a lot.

Political power in most contemporary democracies is not evenly distributed. The available evidence suggests that some individuals enjoy a greater de facto electoral advantage than other candidates, giving them greater access to the office. Examples include the political advantages that incumbents or members of the incumbent party enjoy. The electoral superiority of some groups raises concerns about the extent to which it can create barriers to entry into the political system, leading to under-representation of some groups in society and political arrest by a narrow set of interests. Many modern democracies, such as the Philippines, India, Japan, and the United States

In theory, democracy guarantees an equal voice in government decision-making through a variety of mechanisms such as one person, one vote, equality in political participation, and free speech. Democracy has the potential to develop an environment that is responsive to the needs of its citizens, which often results in higher levels of investment in human

capital and more inclusive and equitable social and economic outcomes. However, underdeveloped democratic institutions can be associated with weak political participation and thus result in, in some cases, political dynasties. However, political dynasties can exist in any democracy regardless of their structure. A brief survey of the literature shows that the share of legislators with past dynastic ties to parliaments ranges from as low as 6% in the United States (Bó et al., 2009) or 10% in Argentina (Martín A. Rossi, 2017) to as high as 37–40% in Japan and Mexico (Asako et al., 2015). In the case of the Philippines, the share of political dynasties is estimated to be between 50% (Querubin, 2016) and 70% (Geys, 2017a) if links to local government units are included in the count.

There is a perception that the existence of political dynasties implies a degradation of political equality and that the resulting political monopoly leads to a deterioration of socio-economic results that prevents individuals from expressing their needs effectively to the government. In addition, dynastic officials can use state power for personal gain without fear of replacement or administrative sanctions. They also rig the election of political leaders, thereby favoring those who are influential, possibly preventing the best and brightest from serving in government, and/or biased policies in favor of certain groups. However, an alternative view suggests that political dynasties provide reformers with an extension of time that allows for more effective planning and implementation of policies with long-term goals. Politicians with shorter terms of the office often submit to populist demands and avoid difficult but needed reforms that bear fruit in the future, and are critical to sustainable, strong, and inclusive growth. It is also possible that dynastic politicians have inheritance-related motivations that are closely tied to the overall outcome in their respective jurisdictions. Thus, the longer their tenure, the more likely they are to care about long-term outcomes. Alternatively, rent-seeking dynastic politicians, after recognizing the financial benefits of adopting growth-oriented policies and strategies, may also be motivated to enact reforms that will result

in large and sustainable economic growth in their own jurisdiction. The net effect of political dynasties on social and economic performance remains an empirical issue in this respect.


Narrow family party candidates benefit from an electoral advantage over other candidates, enabling members of this family to hold public office for decades. The Kennedy family in the United States, the Gandhi family in India, and the Aquino family in the Philippines are noteworthy examples (Querubin, 2016).

The political success of the dynasty was influenced by strong family networks within the government. Success is also rooted in sources completely outside the political system, such as ownership of land, wealth, and social networks. It is also likely that their influence, to some degree, derives from previous family members' access to the political system. Once in power, an incumbent can use office instruments to increase the political power of his relatives, for example by using public resources for personal enrichment or to fund patronage and clientelistic practices that are important drivers of electoral success in many developing countries. Conceptually, it would be desirable to outline occupational roles by previous relatives of other observable and unobserved family characteristics that correlate with political power. This conceptual challenge is similar to that underlying the incumbent party's electoral superiority. Candidates from the ruling party can enjoy electoral advantages due to the characteristics of the party that make them popular in certain areas (and thus more likely to access office) than the party's incumbent status.

Mapping of Political Dynasties Themes

Figure 5 shows that the political themes of dynasties have very broad, complex, and interrelated dimensions. Politics is a multidimensional theme involving various aspects, such as social, economic, legal, state institutions, society, to education. In addition, dynastic politics is part of a big problem that has many impacts on the life and governance of

Figure 5. Mapping Themes in Dynastic Political Studies



Sources: Authors (2022).

a region. Many actors take part in the practice of dynastic politics in a democratic country and its impact also involves many parties. Therefore, it is necessary to have a multisector approach in analyzing dimensional political practices, so that we can find out what are the factors that cause dimensional politics and find out how to break up political dynasties in a democratic country.

Dynastic politics is a system that has been formed from a systematically developed process. The ongoing process is also influenced by policy regulations in terms of candidacy in general elections. Policies regarding the nomination of good political candidates must include the qualification requirements of the candidate. The quality of the candidate candidates must be considered in order to get qualified and competent candidates to hold positions as regional heads. The factor of family origin must be included in the qualifications of candidates for regional leadership to avoid the formation of political dynasties. Every state institution related to politics must work together and work together to maintain integrity to prevent dynastic political practices that will only benefit certain groups, groups or families. The quality and competence of

prospective leaders are the most important things in democratic politics.

Political dynasties spread due to 3 (three) factors, namely: (i) the strength of capital; (ii) network strength; and (iii) position in the party. The reality of political dynasties can be defined as political patronage. The political transformation that has occurred in most democratic countries, where regional heads are directly elected by the people, has had a negative impact on the democratization process. This is because elections have directly opened up space for deeper patronage (the logic of the exchange of interests). The elected regional head tries to use his position to act as the owner of the main source. This role is not difficult for regional heads to play. Through their position, these political leaders have many opportunities to use public institutions as their domain of power and exchange public resources under their control to advance certain agendas. The successful team soon turned into a political broker because it was considered to have second-order resources.

The adage that blood is thicker than water is increasingly embodied in democratic countries. Kinship and dynastic politics, or family politics, appear to be getting stronger.

This is inseparable from the poor political recruitment process carried out by political parties in the elections, especially the post-conflict local elections. Kinship politics is identical to the concentration of power in a certain family or political relatives. The strengthening of kinship politics like this is of course very worrying. If this trend widens, it is not impossible that in the near future Indonesian politics will be similar to the Philippines, where territorial-based bossism dominates politics. The country is run by a handful of elites from several powerful political families, clans, or dynasties in a particular region, and it is therefore very difficult to expect expanded access to power and a healthy and substantial democratic process. This reality is increasingly prevalent in our local democracies which have built political dynasties but have not been able to guarantee the welfare of their people.

Theoretically, the practice of political dynasties raises various problematic threats in political life at the local level. In the framework of consolidating local democracy, the practice of political dynasties narrows the space for public participation and negates one of the basic principles of democracy, namely political equality. In addition, political dynasties will only strengthen the phenomenon of oligarchy in the regions, which has the potential to weaken the check and balance mechanism because the political office is controlled by one family. According to Amich Alhumami (Muslikhah et al., 2019), a social researcher at the University of Sussex, UK, political affiliation or relationships between political dynasties do not comply with the principles of meritocracy because the recruitment process is focused on family opinion and not on competence. According to him, if it continues, this phenomenon could be counterproductive to efforts to build a modern democratic system. The domination of power by a group of local elites or families will ultimately lead to vulnerability to various forms of abuse (corruption) of political and economic power.

The phenomenon of political dynasties has received attention from the public. The impact of the existence of the dynasty was felt directly by the community, especially in

the lack of improvement and effectiveness of performance implementation for the benefit of community welfare. Bardhan and Mokherjee in their research on decentralization and anti-poverty in India found three serious threats to elite capture in programs designed by local governments: First, the corruption of resources by local governments used for the benefit of certain elite groups or political dynasties. Second, inefficiency in allocations where the resulting policies and programs are not well-targeted or are misused; For example, for poverty alleviation programs, allocations are directed to certain elite groups and not to groups of people who need it most. Finally, dynasties cause unhealthy institutions and harm the institutions themselves. Sujarwoto (Guritno et al., 2019) also proves that political dynasties have a negative impact on poverty alleviation in Indonesia, as illustrated by the higher percentage of poverty in districts/cities that are held by political dynasties than non-political dynasties.

In the public's eye, however, political dynasties are not inherently evil. On political selection by dynasties, Besley and Reynal-Querol (van Coppenolle, 2017) found that dynasties will end on their own when the economic performance of dynastic leadership is low, while people will obtain dynastic leadership if their economic performance is good. In addition, Mendoza et al. (Mendoza et al., 2016) proved that dynasty does not affect poverty; dynastic politics did not reduce or increase poverty. Non-political dynasties are not seen as viable alternatives to political dynasties, they claim, but poverty enhances political dynasties. However, there is a link between political dynasties and socio-economic aspects, in which political dynasties are scattered in areas with relatively high poverty levels. The reduction of poverty and inequality of income distribution is a direct and indirect impact of the fiscal decentralization policy in which local governments play an important role through open and direct policies.

CONCLUSION

This study discusses dynastic politics in a democratic country which includes 6 clusters and has five main topics. Furthermore, it appears that there are 50 concepts from 60 articles obtained from the Scopus database. The results of the review with VOSviewer show that there are six cluster concepts. Cluster 1 is the concept of dynastic politics, which is related to power passed down from generation to generation, cluster 2 which emphasizes the concept of government and law in democratic countries, cluster 3 is related to the environment and factors that affect power politics, cluster 4 which focuses on political management, cluster 5 which focuses on communication, trust, and risk in dynastic politics, and finally, cluster 6 focuses on the influence of kinship relations in politics. In addition, the themes in the study of dynastic politics are grouped into six main categorizations namely politics, family relations, general elections, local issues, and dynasties.

This study contributes to the mapping of dynastic political studies, which provides an overview of the dominant topics being discussed. In particular, this topic explains how dynastic politics contains the interests and behavior of political actors who have positions in state institutions. Actors involved in the process of creating dynastic politics in democratic countries include politicians, governments, and the public as voters who are actively involved in general elections.

The limitation of this research is that the articles reviewed only come from the Scopus database, so they do not have comparable data. As a result, future studies need to use a comparative analytical approach involving the Scopus database and the Web of Sciences (WoS).

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