Insider Intervention Model in the Sabotage Attack Scenario of a Nuclear Reactor Facility
Keywords:
Physical Protection System, Insider, EASI, SabotageAbstract
Physical Protection System (PPS) at nuclear facilities aims to prevent intrusions into nuclear facilities that cause sabotage attacks or illegal theft of nuclear material. Our previous study evaluated PPS effectiveness in scenarios of sabotage attacks by outsiders. However, sabotage attacks can involve insiders and have a worse impact on the effectiveness of the PPS. How far are the negative impacts caused by insiders colluding with outsiders for PPS effectiveness? In this study, we developed two models in the form of insider intervention and collusion with outsiders, and then we analyzed how insider involvement impacts PPS effectiveness. The first is a model that reduces the performance of the protection parameters, and the second is a model that eliminates the performance of the protection parameters. The protection parameters observed in this study are the probability of detection (PD) and the time delay (td). The results show that insider involvement reduces the effectiveness of PPS on average by about 1% to 9%. In certain conditions, the frequency analysis shows that insider intervention in the time delay might have fatal consequences and drastically reduce the effectiveness of PPS performance. Therefore, PPS designers need to pay more attention to the delay element to mitigate the potential negative impacts of insider intervention on the effectiveness of the PPS.
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